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Abstract. Due to low industrial land prices and inefficiently used industrial land, China’s central government has reformed 
land regulations in order to promote more market-oriented industrial land. Considering the differences in land manage-
ment between developed and developing countries, this study aims to investigate the impact of land use regulations on 
industrial land prices in China and the effect of market-oriented reforms of industrial land policy. Measures that capture 
multiple dimensions of land use regulation tools are incorporated into OLS models based on a micro dataset from 1999 to 
2016 that covers Jiaxing City in Eastern China. The results show that (1) The land policy implemented in 2006 to promote 
industrial land marketization has had a very limited effect; (2) The impact of land supply on industrial land prices was 
decreased for land transferred through listings after 2006, which implies an immature marketization; (3) Zoning instru-
ments has obvious effects on industrial land prices; (4) The results imply that the effect of land use regulations varies with 
firm ownership and development zones. The findings in this paper clearly show that the industrial land market should be 
more open and competitive and combined with a rational land supply to promote the market-oriented price mechanism.
Keywords: industrial land use, industrial land price, land use regulation, land use planning, land marketization, land use 
efficiency.
Introduction
Because of the accelerated economic development and 
rapid urbanization in China, land prices in Chinese cities 
are rapidly increasing. From 2000 to 2017, residential and 
commercial land prices increased by 7.1 times and 4.53 
times, respectively, but industrial land prices increased by 
only 1.79 times. In a survey conducted in Hangzhou, the 
capital of Zhejiang province, land prices accounted for 
only one-third of the total cost of clean land. The most 
direct impact of the low industrial land price is the low 
efficiency of industrial land use, which is manifested in the 
fact that some industrial land is not fully utilized and that 
the overall output efficiency is low. Among the 520 na-
tional-level development zones, more than 30% (34.61%) 
utilized 70% to 90% of their land. Strengthening the su-
pervision of land use and increasing the retransfer of stock 
land are necessary.
The Chinese government has hoped to improve the ef-
ficiency of industrial land and accelerate the marketization 
of industrial land allocation through reforming industrial 
land regulations. Before 2006, industrial land was trans-
ferred through negotiation between the government and 
enterprises at a very low price and was not transferred 
through the open market. In 2006, the State Council is-
sued its Notice on Strengthening Relevant Issues Con-
cerning Land Regulation and Control, which required 
industrial land to be transferred from the government to 
industrial firms through open channels, including ten-
der, auction and listing. The minimum transfer price is 
also enforced to prohibit industrial land from selling at a 
low price. Moreover, the zoning code, including the floor 
area ratio (FAR) and percentage of built area (density), is 
required to be announced clearly. Since this policy was 
implemented, negotiation types of industrial land trans-
fers are limited.
Despite many studies on the factors that influence land 
use regulation for residential properties, studies focusing 
on industrial properties are limited and mostly base on 
data from developed countries (Callahan, 2017; Saz-Sala-
zar & Leandro, 2005). In terms of research on industrial 
land prices, Chinese scholars have initiated an upsurge in 
research, mostly along two angles. The first angle is an 
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exploration of the low industrial land price mechanism in 
China. The research of Wu (2007) and Zhang et al. (2017) 
on industrial land prices focused on interregional govern-
mental and international competition. Wu et  al. (2014) 
explained the causes of low industrial land prices using 
a “centipede game model.” The other angle is an investi-
gation of the factors that influence industrial land prices 
through quantitative studies. Most of these articles are 
based on panel data at the city level (Lin & Ben, 2009; Jin 
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Zhao & Xiao, 2012; Huang 
et al., 2017) and analyze the influence of economic and fi-
nancing factors. Only a few of these studies base on micro 
data that can detect the impact of factors, such as neigh-
borhood attributes, location attributes, and agglomeration 
(Lin & Ben, 2009; Tu et al., 2017).
The previous research exploring the influence from 
land use regulations concentrating on land prices and 
residential properties (Black & Hoben, 1985; Quigley & 
Rosenthal, 2005; Glaeser & Ward, 2009; Kok et al., 2014). 
However, research investigating industrial land prices, 
specifically the importance of land use regulations, has 
received little attention in China and developing coun-
tries. The context of land use regulations is also different 
from that in developed countries. The research conducted 
by Fu and Somerville (2001) and Brueckner et al. (2017) 
investigated the impact on land values. Only the paper by 
Han et  al. (2020), based on transaction data from 2007 
to 2016 that cover 286 prefectural cities, summarizes 
the main land use regulation instruments, including the 
constructed land quota, the allowed FAR and land sup-
ply restrictions and its influence on industrial land prices. 
However, this research matched land transaction parcels 
at the prefectural city level and calculated the average 
land price as the final value for each city. Because of the 
heterogeneity of land prices based on city-level data, this 
empirical analysis has limitations. The weakness of using 
average land values is that they depend heavily on actual 
land parcels. For example, in a city with a high percentage 
of land parcels in the suburban area and a city with a high 
percentage of land parcels in downtown areas, the former 
will have comparatively low land values in the end, but 
this will lead to distortions in the actual value.
In this paper, first, from the theoretical perspective, an 
integrated conceptual framework is presented to illustrate 
the multiple influential pathways from land use regula-
tions to industrial land prices. In addition, accurate indus-
trial land plot information provides powerful supplement 
to the existing literature to address the heterogeneity of 
industrial land prices by different levels of development 
zones, subtypes of industrial firms and land transfer types. 
The goal of this paper is to provide basic implications and 
information regarding the marketization of industrial land 
transfer and fundamental policy directions.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the first sec-
tion, we describe the background of land use regulations 
in China; the second section describes the study area and 
data; the third section explains the model and variables; 
the fourth section provides the empirical results; and the 
fifth section provides a discussion. In the final section, the 
conclusions and policy implications are presented.
1. Background of land use regulations in China
Before 2006, the main method for companies to purchase 
industrial land use rights was to negotiate with local gov-
ernments, and they did not need to conduct open market 
transactions. The result was a low industrial land price and 
a large number of industrial parks, which leads to an in-
efficiently industrial land-use model. After the industrial 
output value of industrial land in China reached a peak 
of 2105 RMB/m2 in 2013, it gradually declined. From the 
perspective of absorbing the employed population, the use 
of industrial land also continued to decline (Figure 1).
The underlying reason for the local government trans-
fer of industrial land use rights at a very low price that 
did not compensate for the cost of the land is that local 
Figure 1. Industrial output and employment per unit of industrial land from 2000 to 2016 (source: National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017; Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, P. R. China, 2017)
78 F. Tu et al. How do land use regulations influence industrial land prices? Evidence from China
governments prefer the GDP increases that industrial 
firms can bring. Although “promotion tournaments” have 
led to miraculous growth in China and served as an in-
centive system for local officials, this system is the root 
of many pressing social and economic problems (Zhou, 
2007). Governmental intervention in the industrial land 
market offers industrial park management services and 
significantly influences decisions regarding the location, 
quantity, sale prices, and first trade-off of industrial loca-
tions (Shen & Sun, 2012).
In 2006, the Chinese economy exhibited signs of in-
flation, with a GDP growth of 10.7%, the fastest growth 
since 1995, and the fourth consecutive year of double-
digit economic growth since 2002. The central govern-
ment formally and systematically introduced land poli-
cies at the end of 2006 as a macroeconomic control tool 
to prohibit the expansion of industrial parks at very low 
transferred land prices. To push for market mechanisms 
to allocate industrial land. The State Council specified that 
“industry, commerce, tourism, entertainment, and profit-
oriented residential land, or land that has two intended 
uses, must be transferred through tender, auction, or list-
ing approaches.” The new marketization mechanisms can 
facilitate the entry of multiple potential users into the land 
transfer process, thereby increasing land prices and im-
proving future land use efficiency.
The traditional rationale for the regulation of land use 
in urban areas is to promote economic efficiency through 
the control of external effects. Although there are vari-
ous approaches to government interventions in land and 
property markets, there is no single definition of land use 
regulation. Based on the industrial land regulation reform 
in China and the regulation tools mentioned in papers 
that focus on the experience of developed countries, we 
consider three classes of regulations: (1) policy changes 
that influence the financial costs faced by developers and 
industrial firms, (2) zoning codes that impact the con-
ditions of industrial land transfer, and (3) industry land 
quotas, because the land supply is decided by the local 
government.
The first class of regulations is exhibited in the policy 
implemented at the end of 2006, which not only changed 
the method of industrial land transfer but also established 
the bottom line for the industrial land transfer price. After 
that, the following three land use transfer methods were 
utilized: auction (Pai Mai), listing (Gua Pai) and tender 
(Zhao Pia), in contrast with the negotiation that took 
place between local governments and industrial firms 
before 2006. An auction requires the bidder to make an 
open bid at a specified time and place. Usually, the highest 
bidder obtains the land use rights (Peng & Liu, 2015). The 
difference between a listing and an auction is that a listing 
usually takes place for a certain period of time, such as 
10 days. In contrast, auctions occur on site, and the time 
allotted to determine the price application and make com-
petitive decisions is very limited. Tender involves inviting 
specific organizations to bid, and the final land users are 
determined according to the tender conditions. In many 
circumstances, the final bidder is not the applicant with 
the highest bid.
The second type of land use regulation imposes ex-
plicit limitations on available building capacity for build-
ers; these limits include the FAR, building density and ra-
tio of green space. The government sets zoning rules for 
each industrial land plot under land transfer conditions. A 
mandatory percentage of building density, FAR and ratio 
of green space is assigned in the land transfer contract 
between industrial firms and the local government. In ad-
dition, there is a minimum baseline FAR, building density 
and ratio of green space according to different industry 
subtypes that differs from that of commercial and residen-
tial land. In the latter situation, in most cases, maximum 
indicators are set, which is similar to zoning in developed 
countries.
The third type of land use regulation is the quota 
of land supply, which does not exist in many countries. 
Wang et  al. (2010) and Han et  al. (2020) illustrate how 
the quantity of land supply for the entire permitted area 
from farmland to construction land is decided. However, 
although the two articles explain in detail the overall land 
use planning approach, the annual new construction land 
plan, and the relationship between the two, neither article 
mentions the annual transfer plan. The plan ultimately de-
termines how much actual urban land can be transferred 
from the government each year, including industrial, com-
mercial, and residential land.
Figure 2 explains the relationship and interaction be-
tween the Annual Urban Land Transfer Plan (niandu tudi 
churang jihua), the Land Use Master Plan (tudi liyong 
zongti guihua) and the Annual Land Use Plan (niandu 
tudi liyong jihua). The Master Plan sets long-term regula-
tions, i.e., generally between 10 and 15 years, regarding 
both the quantity and spatial distributions of local agri-
cultural land and the ultimate quantities that can be con-
verted to construction land (jianshe yongdi, referring to 
land for nonagricultural use). The Annual Land Use Plan 
is also issued by the higher-level government and based on 
the Master Plan. Due to the impact of economic develop-
ment, the Annual Land Use Plan is not equivalent to the 
quotas determined by the Master Plan divided by the total 
number of implementation years. If the accumulation of 
construction exceeds the quotas in the Master Plan, the 
Master Plan will be reformulated. The remaining power 
of the local government is to draw up the Annual Urban 
Land Transfer Plan, which distributes the land quota by 
type of urban land uses, including commercial, residential, 
industrial, infrastructure and public facilities. This plan is 
based on not only how much land can be converted from 
agricultural land to construction land, which is deter-
mined by the Annual Land Plan, but also on the urban 
stock land, which is land that was converted from agricul-
tural use in previous years and has not been for construc-
tion, as well as idle land or retransferred urban land.
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2. Study area and data
2.1. Study area
The present study analyzed the factors influencing indus-
trial land pricing based primarily on samples of new in-
dustrial land plots supplied by the eastern coastal city of 
Jiaxing from 1999 to 2016. The study area, Jiaxing City, 
which is in Zhejiang Province, is located in the central 
area of the Yangtze River Delta region in Eastern China 
(Figure 3). Jiaxing City has an administrative area of 
4275 km2 and has 2 districts, 3 cities and 2 counties, with 
a population of 4.65 million at the end of 2017. The GDP 
per capita is approximately US$14,000 (Jiaxing Statistical 
Bureau, 2018).
Jiaxing was selected for the case study for two reasons. 
First, in terms of geographical location and economic de-
velopment, Jiaxing is a good representative of cities in 
China’s eastern area. The industrial added value of Jiaxing 
comprises nearly half of its GDP, and its economic de-
velopment is at the average level for cities in the Yangtze 
River Delta region. Second, open data for industrial land 
plots dates back almost to 2006. The data bottleneck ex-
plains why articles that explore industrial land prices focus 
mostly on data after 2006. We collected data before 2006 
from the Jiaxing Natural Resource and Planning Bureau. 
These datasets cover the period from 1999 to 2016, which 
broadly supplements the data on transferred industrial 
land plots and helps analyze changes in the industrial land 
transfer market over a longer period.
Figure 2. Formulation of industrial land quotas in the Annual Urban Land Transfer Plan
Figure 3. Location of Jiaxing City and industrial land plots 
obtained through transfer in Jiaxing from 1999 to 2016
2.2. Data
Using this dataset, we identified 9133 industrial land 
properties in Jiaxing City that were sold by local govern-
ments to industrial firms from 1999 to 2016 (Figure 3). 
The industrial land price dataset contains the price of land 
transferred from government to enterprises as well as the 
area of the land and the transfer type. In addition to the 
land value, information about the land location inside 
and outside of development zones, industry type and firm 
ownership type were recorded and used to deepen the re-
search. Therefore, data with incomplete attribute informa-
tion were removed from the database. After screening, the 
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final dataset consisted of 6590 industrial land properties. 
We calculated the shortest paths to and the reachability 
of harbors, city centers, airports, and highways based on 
Baidu maps and geospatial information.
3. Model and variables
3.1. Model selection
A hedonic price estimation is probably the natural starting 
point for analyzing property values. However, it should be 
noted that hedonic pricing theory assumes that markets 
are perfectly competitive (Rosen, 1974). Supply in Chi-
na’s land market is determined by the local government. 
Moreover, strong competition exists among local govern-
ments to attract industrial firms through low land prices. 
The price of auctioned land more accurately conveys the 
market’s signal. From 1999 to 2016, the price of listed and 
negotiated industrial land plots was much lower than the 
price of auctioned land (Figure 4). Therefore, the data do 
not fully meet the conditions for a hedonic model. Using 
the panel dataset from Han et al. (2020), the results ac-
count for approximately only 30% of the variance.
Therefore, we used a multiple linear regression model 
to examine the effects of land use regulations on industrial 
land prices. This model may be written as follows:
0 1 2 3i i i i iLnP LR Location Firm= β +β +β +β + ε . (1)
In Eq. (1), the natural log of industrial land value is the 
dependent variable. In addition, Pi is the price of industri-
al land i;  iLR is a group of land use regulation attributes; 
iLocation  is a group of location characteristics (e.g., prox-
imity to highways, proximity to harbors, CBD);  iFirm  is 
the industrial firm’s characteristics;  iε is an error term. 
All the numeric explanatory variables are algorithmized.
The second step is an OLS model that includes interac-
tion terms as independent variables. The formula for the 
OLS model used in the current study is shown in Eq. (2). 
By integrating the POLICY variable and other land use 
regulations using the full sample and by stratifying the 
sample according to the type of firm ownership, develop-
ment zone, and transfer method, the impacts of POLICY 
can be explored more comprehensively.




i i i i
i i
LnP LR POLICY LR Location
Firm
= β +β +β +β +
β + ε  (2)
3.2. Variables
The dependent variable that this study focused on was 
the transferred price of industrial land. The mean and 
median sale prices for industrial land from 1999 to 2016 
were 236.37 RMB/m2 and 203.95 RMB/m2, respectively 
(Figure 5).
Previous studies have reported the capacity of meth-
odologies to explain industrial land value price differen-
tiation for different types of neighborhoods and locations 
(Kowalski & Paraskevopoulos, 1990; Asabere & Huffman, 
1991; Atteberry & Rutherford, 1993; Fehribach et al., 1993; 
Lockwood & Rutherford, 1996; Tu et  al., 2017). Due to 
the characteristics of industrial properties, the effects of 
environmental contamination have also received atten-
tion, and its impacts on industrial poverty values have 
been explored (Braimoh & Onishi, 2007; Jackson, 2002; 
Figure 4. Comparisons of industrial land prices from 1999 to 
2016 for land transferred via listing, auction, and negotiation
Figure 5. Scatter plot of transferred industrial land prices from 1999 to 2016
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Guntermann, 1995). The influence of building supply on 
the determination of industrial properties has also been 
investigated (Atteberry & Rutherford, 1993; Thompson & 
Tsolacos, 2001). In addition to these relationships, studies 
have examined the relationship between industrial prop-
erty values and economic trends. Peiser (1987) found the 
labor agglomeration have a positive effect on industrial 
property values. Thompson and Tsolacos (1999) previous-
ly established macroeconomic variables that capture cycli-
cal economic activity. Similarly, financial and monetary 
variables have been employed to analyze the repercus-
sions of changes in financial market conditions, monetary 
policies, and expectations on industrial real estate values 
(Atteberry & Rutherford, 1993; Lockwood & Rutherford, 
1996).
To verify our theoretical hypothesis, the FAR, building 
density, ratio of green space, annual industrial land sup-
ply and 2006 policy were selected as explanatory variables 
in the models, and locational attributes and enterprise at-
tributes were used as control variables. Distances to the 
nearest highway, port, airport, train station and CBD were 
also considered. The accessibility of the highway, which 
means the number of entrances within a designated dis-
tance, was also included among the locational attributes. 
A number of dummy variables related to locational attrib-
utes was added for each property according to whether 
the property was located in a national- or provincial-level 
economic zone, the category of the industrial enterprise 
and whether the enterprise was a private, state or foreign 
company.
Distance to highways was calculated in two ways. First, 
we calculated the travel distance from the plot to the near-
est expressway based on the Baidu map road network, and 
HIGHWAY_Nearest represents the shortest travel distance 
to the expressway. Second, we calculated the number of 
highway entrances and exits within a 10-km radius of the 
land plot, with HIGHWAY_Accessibility representing the 
convenience of travel to the expressway.
In Jiaxing, there are five ports altogether. Zhapu har-
bor is located in Jiaxing. Among the other four harbors, 
Shanghai harbor and Yanshan harbor are in Shanghai, 
and Beilun harbor and Zhoushan harbor are in Zhejiang 
Province. All four harbors are deep-water ports that can 
provide international ocean transportation. Therefore, the 
variable PORT_Nearest measures the shortest distance to 
the four seaports outside Jiaxing. Meanwhile, PORT_Zha-
pu indicates the distance to Zhapu port, which covers sea 
transportation to other areas in China (Figure 6).
In terms of airports, although there is no airport in 
Jiaxing City, considering its central location in the Yangzi 
delta area, there are three international airports around 
Jiaxing City. One is Xiaoshan International Airport in 
Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province. The other 
two international airports are both in Shanghai: Hongqiao 
airport and Pudong airport. Pudong airport is far from 
Hongqiao. Therefore, the variables of AIRPORT_Xiaoshan 
and AIRPORT_Hongqiao indicate the distance to Xia-
oshan airport and Hongqiao airport (Figure 7).
In addition, we also calculate the travel distance from 
the land plot to the nearest train station and CBD based 
on the Baidu map road network. Thus, five locational 
variables were used in the final analysis: PORT_Nearest, 
PORT_Zhapu, AIRPORT_Xiaoshan, AIRPORT_Hong-
qiao, TRAIN, HIGHWAY_Nearest, HIGHWAY_Accessi-
bility, and CBD (Table 1).
4. Results
4.1. The impact of land use regulations on 
industrial land prices
Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. We tested for 
heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test, and the 
fitted values of the dependent variables failed to reject the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, thus affecting the 
efficiency of the estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors were generated to correct for the estimate 
Figure 6. Location of ports in Jiaxing and nearby areas Figure 7. Location of airports in Jiaxing and nearby areas
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efficiencies using White’s (1980) method. The final esti-
mates use heteroskedastic-robust forms. Model 1 is based 
on all control variables. Model 2 includes land use regula-
tion variables with all control variables. In Model 3, we 
examine the interaction effect between policy dummies 
and other land use regulations to investigate how the im-
plementation of the 2006 policy impacts the change of 
other land use regulations. Model 4 uses only land regula-
tion variables, and it was compared Model 3 to determine 
whether there was a market difference, which indicates 
endogeneity. Overall, the regression exhibited satisfactory 
explanatory power, with adjusted R squared values as high 
as 0.607 in Model 2 and 0.609 in Model 3, indicating the 
goodness of fit of these models. In addition, the high F 
statistic suggests the overall significance of the estimated 
models. As reported, most of the explanatory variables are 
significant.
The results in Model 2 clearly indicate that the co-
efficients of most land use regulation variables, includ-
ing FAR, DENSITY, GREEN (green ratio) and POLICY 
(change in land use policies), were positive. Each addi-
tional percentage increase of FAR and DENSITY increases 
the price of a parcel by 12.3% and 4.42%, respectively. In 
contrast, the green space percentage of the land parcel area 
(GREEN) will have a negative relationship with industrial 
land price. This illustrates a preference of industrial en-
terprises for land plots with large available constructed 
lands. In terms of changes in land use policy, land prices 
after 2016 increased by 59.08%, suggesting that setting 
the threshold price for industrial land transfer dramati-
cally increased the final land transfer results. However, in 
Model 2, the variable SUPPLY did not significantly impact 
industrial land transfer prices, which may be a result of 
the oversupply of industrial land from the government, 
which is consistent with the findings of previous research 
(Han et al., 2020).
We now include the interaction terms in Model 3. 
The purpose of the Chinese government changing the 
industrial land transfer policy at the end of 2006 was to 
increase industrial land use efficiency and push for mar-
ket mechanisms to allocate industrial land (partially as a 
strategy to cool the economy). Given this, we hypothesize 
that the interaction terms between the POLICY dummy 
and the other land use regulation variables should be sig-
nificant. The result of the Model 3 regression shows that 
most interaction terms between POLICY and other land 
use regulation variables become insignificant except for 
the GREEN variable. This indicates that every percentage 
increase of the GREEN variable after 2006 will decrease 
the land prices by 19.81%, which is lower than the 36.75% 
decrease for before 2006. Table 2 shows that there is no 
marked difference between Model 3 and Model 4, indicat-
ing that the endogeneity issue is not a serious problem.
The directions of most of the location variables were 
as expected and significant. Industrial land located near 
harbors, train stations and airports had significantly in-
creased transfer values. The findings in Model 3 indicate 
that the shortest distance to the five harbors plays a sig-
nificant role in increasing industrial land prices, and the 
highest marginal effect was 22.18%. Meanwhile, a closer 
Table 1. The definition and description of the variables in the model




DENSITY Building density 44.566 10.977 1 86
FAR Floor area ratio 1.297 0.494 0.33 3.5
GREEN Percentage of green space 21.383 7.229 0.300 69
SUPPLY Total industrial land supply each year 1529.884 766.284 41.685 3560.562
POLICY Indicates the end of the 2006 
policy implemented by the central 
government to facilitate the market 
mechanism in industrial land transfer
0.429 0.495 0 1
Location 
attributes
PORT_Nearest The closest distance to the four 
seaports outside Jiaxing
116.543 26.074 70.80 172.7
PORT_Zhapu The distance to Zhapu Harbor 42.171 20.730 0.3 83
AIRPORT_Xiaoshan The distance to the Xiaoshan Airport 86.031 26.001 25.70 129.1
AIRPORT_Hongqiao The distance to the Hongqiao Airport 94.649 24.376 51.6 146.7
TRAIN The shortest travel distance to a train 
station
17.001 9.562 0.3 44.9
HIGHWAY_Nearest The shortest travel distance to the 
expressway
9.436 4.965 0.1 26.1
HIGHWAY_Accessibility The number of highway entrances 
(exits) within 10-km of the plot
0.641 0.822 0 4
CBD The distance to the CBD 13.241 8.347 0.2 68.1
Firm 
attributes
AREA Lot area 1.642 2.529 0.008 65.481
SCALE Total investment 4484.410 11868.890 1.211 404801.5
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Table 2. Results of the regression model of the impact of land use regulation on industrial land price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
lnDENSITY 0.0442*** 0.0498*** 0.0389***
(4.776) (4.373) (3.863)
lnFAR 0.1230*** 0.2305*** 0.2397***
(6.186) (3.257) (3.331)
lnGREEN –0.3264*** –0.3675*** –0.4370***
(10.068) (8.399) (10.705)
lnSUPPLY –0.0039 –0.0020 –0.0042
(0.391) (0.174) (0.353)










lnPORT_Nearest –0.2945** –0.1969* –0.2218**
(2.229) (1.913) (2.127)
lnPORT_Zhapu –0.0570*** –0.0871*** –0.0874***
(3.707) (7.978) (7.921)
lnAIRPORT_Xiaoshan 0.0210 –0.1318** –0.1569***
(0.307) (2.479) (2.983)
lnAIRPORT_Hongqiao 0.3249*** 0.0535 0.0624
(2.971) (0.629) (0.731)
lnTRAIN –0.1047*** –0.0573*** –0.0543***
(7.320) (4.793) (4.465)
lnHIGHWAY_Nearest 0.0008 –0.0045 –0.0033
(0.065) (0.530) (0.386)
HIGHWAY_Accessibility 0.0497*** 0.0323*** 0.0323***
(5.054) (4.715) (4.735)
lnCBD 0.0308*** –0.0385*** –0.0424***
(2.885) (4.458) (4.920)
lnAREA –0.3625*** –0.1000*** –0.0938***
(30.093) (10.849) (9.390)
lnSCALE 0.3903*** 0.0980*** 0.0928***
(40.246) (12.296) (10.564)
_cons 2.5927*** 6.9595*** 7.2727*** 6.2176***
(3.761) (12.971) (13.345) (46.062)
N 6590 6590 6590 6590
F 253.82*** 764.67*** 653.70*** 1072.37***
adj. R-sq 0.284 0.607 0.609 0.580
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses = *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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distance to Zhapu harbor, Xiaoshan airport, train station 
and CBD in each county increases industrial land transfer 
prices by approximately 8.74%, 15.69%, 5.43% and 4.24%, 
respectively. The variable HIGHWAY_Accessibility, which 
measures the number of entrances to the freeway within 
10 kilometers, also has a positive impact on industrial land 
prices. This result illustrates that accessibility to highway 
entrances and exits is more important than distance to 
the highway.
4.2. The impact of land use regulations on 
industrial land prices from the perspective of land 
transfer type
The government’s policy goal at the end of 2006 was to re-
duce the proportion of negotiation transfers and increase 
the proportion of the other three transfer types. Figure 5 
shows that the degree of land prices is completely consist-
ent with the degree of marketization; that is, the auction 
price is the highest, the negotiation price is the lowest, 
and the listing and tender prices are close. The ratio of 
listed land to the full land plot after 2006 was the high-
est, and the proportion of land transferred by negotiation 
decreased significantly (Figure 8). Figure 4 and Figure 8 
also imply that the local government does not seek the 
highest price during the process of industrial land transfer. 
Due to the high price of auctioned land, auctioning is not 
used as the main method of transfer. There are only 22 
auctioned parcels in total. Tendering types are relatively 
complicated and are not widely used. Only 10 land plots 
were transferred from local government to industrial firms 
through tender from 2000 to 2017.
Table 3 shows the impact of land use regulation on 
industrial land prices by land transfer type. All models 
were significant at p < 0.05, indicating that at least one 
independent variable in each model was significantly cor-
related with the dependent variable.
With the two transfer methods, the coefficient FAR 
and GREEN have significant effects. The FAR has a posi-
tive significant role in industrial land price, while the 
GREEN variable has the opposite effect. Meanwhile, the 
empirical results suggest that the sensitivity of land price 
Figure 8. Comparison of industrial land by listing and 
negotiation types
Table 3. Results of the regression model of the impact of land 
















































adj. R-sq 0.314 0.273
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses = *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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to DENSITY levels through negotiation is more significant 
than that through listing, indicating heterogeneity of the 
stringency of DENSITY constraints. From the interaction 
of policies and other variables, the impact of the green 
space rate is the same as in the case of the entire sample.
According to the empirical results, the coefficient be-
tween land supply and industrial land price is significant-
ly different under the listing and transfer methods. This 
policy significantly increased the price of the land trans-
ferred through negotiation by 86.38%. However, for land 
plots transferred through listing, for every 1% increase in 
land supply before 2006, industrial land prices decrease by 
52.81%, and there was only a 1% decrease after 2006. This 
is a very interesting finding that implies that the function 
of listing changed after 2006, indicating that listing is not 
a perfect tool for promoting industrial land marketization 
and suggesting the need to explore why this form of open 
transfer did not perform as predicted.
4.3. The impact of land use regulations on 
industrial land prices from the perspective of firm 
ownership
Figure 9 shows the distribution of land prices among in-
dustrial enterprises with different ownership attributes. 
Private enterprises have the highest average price of in-
dustrial land and the largest difference; state-owned en-
terprises have the lowest average price and the smallest 
difference; and foreign companies are in the middle.
Table 4 shows the impact of land regulation on indus-
trial enterprises by ownership attributes. Most of the char-
acteristics of land regulation have a significant impact on 
private and foreign companies. Both FAR and POLICY in-
crease the price of industrial land under these two owner-
ship types, and the green space rate has a negative impact. 
In contrast, state-owned enterprises are not obvious for 
most of the land regulatory characteristics. A significant 
effect is seen for only the explanatory variable of building 
density, and the positive impact is also different from that 
Figure 9. Comparison of industrial land prices by  
ownership type
Table 4. Results of the regression model of the impact of land 







lnDENSITY 0.0566*** 0.1559*** –0.0258
(4.584) (3.544) (1.020)
lnFAR 0.2027*** 1.0600 0.1993*
(2.784) (1.208) (1.737)
lnGREEN –0.3899*** –0.1222 –0.1333*
(7.954) (0.477) (1.941)
lnSUPPLY –0.0044 –0.1650 0.0575*
(0.370) (1.453) (1.662)
POLICY 0.6093*** 0.2775 0.5147***
(36.026) (1.528) (15.887)
POLICY•lnDENSITY –0.0294 –0.2488 0.0811***
(1.331) (0.982) (2.766)
POLICY•lnFAR –0.0877 –0.7008 –0.0324
(1.158) (0.797) (0.257)
POLICY•lnGREEN 0.1727*** –0.3246 0.1119
(3.253) (1.163) (1.333)
POLICY•lnSUPPLY 0.0042 0.0155 –0.1153*
(0.152) (0.071) (1.773)
lnPORT_Nearest –0.2076* 1.1404 –0.5020
(1.811) (0.921) (1.423)




















lnCBD –0.0516*** –0.0346 0.0172
(5.346) (0.693) (0.958)
lnAREA –0.1012*** –0.1570** –0.0819***
(8.949) (2.145) (4.431)
lnSCALE 0.1004*** 0.1651*** 0.0781***
(9.890) (3.165) (5.075)
_cons 7.3354*** 9.0575** 6.1224***
(11.996) (2.243) (4.815)
N 5730 101 759
F 562.74*** 68.00*** 76.85***
adj. R-sq 0.612 0.615 0.614
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses = *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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in the entire sample. The nonmarketization of industrial 
land acquired by state-owned enterprises is strongly con-
firmed. From the interaction of land policies and other 
land regulations, for private enterprises, the correlation 
coefficient of the negative impact of green space rates on 
prices after 2006 has decreased, while the correlation coef-
ficient of the positive impact of land supply on prices of 
foreign-owned enterprises has also decreased.
4.4. The impact of land use regulations on 
industrial land prices from the perspective of 
development zones
As seen from Figure 10, the industrial land price in the 
national development zone is the highest, followed by 
those in the provincial development zone. The develop-
ment zone will impact the prices of industrial enterprises. 
To attract enterprises, the development zones will choose 
enterprises according to their goals, which will result in 
a selection effect (Sun et al., 2020). For example, the na-
tional development zone will focus more on technology-
intensive enterprises and innovative industrial enterprises. 
High-level development zones also tend to have better 
regional locations. Therefore, industrial enterprises in 
high-level development zones can bear relatively higher 
land costs. At the same time, to attract enterprises, the 
development zone will also introduce preferential policies, 
including tax policies and land policies.
The empirical results in Table 5 show that compared 
to national and provincial development zones, other in-
dustrial plots are more sensitive to variables in land regu-
lation, including FAR, DENSITY, GREEN and POLICY, 
possibly because the enterprises in the national and pro-
vincial development zones are more homogeneous. There-
fore, enterprises outside the development zones are more 
sensitive to changes in indicators related to land use regu-
lations. Compared with provincial development zones, the 
policy of 2006 increased the price of industrial land in 
national development zones more.
Figure 10. Comparisons of industrial firms in national and 
provincial development zones and other areas
Table 5. Results of the regression model of the impact of land 





Firms inside development 
zones
Provincial National
lnDENSITY 0.0444*** 0.0689** –0.0527
(3.719) (2.442) (0.163)
lnFAR 0.2204** 0.1613 0.3942
(2.478) (1.521) (0.897)
lnGREEN –0.4309*** –0.1363*** –0.1808
(7.288) (3.490) (1.336)
lnSUPPLY –0.0003 0.0294 0.0026
(0.024) (1.249) (0.008)
POLICY 0.6187*** 0.4834*** 0.5386***
(32.983) (15.956) (3.306)
POLICY•lnDENSITY –0.0041 –0.0480 0.7383*
(0.212) (0.682) (1.755)
POLICY•lnFAR –0.0913 –0.0147 –0.3157
(0.994) (0.131) (0.687)
POLICY•lnGREEN 0.2454*** –0.0041 –1.0916***
(3.964) (0.077) (2.736)
POLICY•lnSUPPLY –0.0126 –0.1007* 0.1900
(0.455) (1.910) (0.569)
lnPORT_Nearest –0.1544 –0.6881 0.3826
(1.342) (1.546) (0.103)




















lnCBD –0.0361*** 0.0905*** 0.0884
(3.303) (5.802) (1.444)
lnAREA –0.0890*** –0.0918*** –0.1752**
(7.058) (5.833) (2.221)
lnSCALE 0.0940*** 0.0542*** 0.1014
(8.288) (3.907) (1.323)
_cons 8.5847*** –2.6384 –10.5396
(14.716) (1.252) (1.338)
N 5108 1368 114
F 550.01*** 144.52*** 31.96***
adj. R-sq 0.617 0.636 0.762
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses = *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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5. Discussion
China’s industrial land transfer model is very different 
from that of developed countries, and the context of land 
regulation is also inconsistent with that of developed 
countries. Analyzing the factors that influence industrial 
land prices over a longer period of time can help improve 
the understanding of the mechanism behind land price. 
Although the goal of reforming land use regulation is to 
promote the process of marketization and help increase 
the price and output efficiency of industrial land, the op-
erating mechanism behind industrial land transfer is the 
“game” between the central and local governments, which 
is reflected in the results of the OLS model.
1. Limited effects of industrial land policy reform.
Although the policy change in 2006 that promoted mar-
ketization of industrial land prices had significant positive 
effects, the results should be interpreted carefully. Listings 
as the recommended public and marketized tool seems to 
be working, given the number of land plots transferred 
through listings after 2006 rising dramatically, by 86%. 
However, through interaction analysis, the price increase 
in listed transferred industrial land after 2006 was insignifi-
cant. A deep investigation revealed that, although listings 
represented the recommended type of open market trans-
fer, the actual process was not open. Before publicly listing 
land, the government still negotiated with the intended in-
dustrial firm to determine the listing conditions, including 
the price. The listing conditions were then set to prohibit 
other companies from participating in the listing process.
The other important finding is that for listed sites, the 
decrease in the yearly land supply before the implementa-
tion of the policy promoted a significant price increase 
of 53%, but this increase declined to 1% after 2006. The 
findings indicate that the industrial land policy reform 
increased industrial land prices by setting a minimum 
bottom line. However, in terms of promoting a market 
pricing mechanism, the effects were slight. The interac-
tion effects between policy and the FAR, building density, 
and green space ratio show that only the interaction with 
the green space ratio had effects for the subtypes of listed 
land. The price of industrial land increased by 19.81% with 
each 1% decrease in the green space ratio indicator.
2. Slightly influence of land supply on industrial land 
price.
For the entire sample, the land supply did not affect the 
price, which is inconsistent with the basic pricing principle 
under the market mechanism, because of the oversupply of 
industrial land. Regarding the subsamples, the increase in 
the supply scale after 2006 only reduced prices by 1%, far 
below the 21% impact of the green ratio on prices. Overall, 
foreign-owned companies were more sensitive to land sup-
ply quantity than other types of companies.
3. The effect of zoning code and location attributes in 
relation to industrial land prices.
The FAR, building density and greening rate had a 
very obvious effect on land prices. Among these three in-
dicators, the greening ratio had the greatest impact on the 
land value, followed by the FAR. Among zoning codes, 
the FAR and the ratio of green space affect privately and 
foreign-owned land. In the subtype of development zones, 
enterprises outside development zones show strong land 
price sensitivity to most location attributes, compared with 
insensitivity of land plots in national and provincial indus-
trial zones. It is possible that the firms that are located 
nationally and provincial park are more qualified, which 
is reflected in part by the higher prices of plots in these 
location than plots outside the parks. From the firms’ side, 
they prefer policy incentives such as tax deductions, more 
convenient government services and agglomeration effects 
in national and provincial-level industrial zones. Location 
factors have a significant impact on private and foreign 
companies, but state-owned enterprises are insensitive to 
most indicators.
Conclusions
The present study focused on the impact of land use 
regulations on industrial land prices. Micro data of 6590 
industrial land plots from 1999 to 2016 in Jiaxing City, 
Zhejiang Province were used. OLS models were used to 
analyze the impacts of land use regulations on industrial 
land prices. The contributions of this study are as follows: 
(1) Although some articles have analyzed the impacts of 
land use regulations on residential property values, re-
search investigating determinants of industrial land prices, 
specifically from the perspective of land use regulations, 
has received limited attention. (2) Different from the lit-
erature addressing land use regulations, most in developed 
countries, our study examined three types of land use reg-
ulations, including policy to promote land use efficiency 
and industrial land transfer marketization, zoning codes 
that impact conditions in industrial land transfer, and the 
quota of industry land supply each year. (3) This study not 
only examined land use regulations but also heterogeneity 
from the perspective of land transfer type, ownership of 
industrial firms, and development zones.
The targeted land policy was implemented at the end 
of 2006 to promote more efficient land use and industrial 
land marketization. Although it is the policy very signifi-
cantly increased the industrial land prices based on the 
whole dataset, it had a limited effect on industrial land 
that was transferred through listing, which was the main 
transfer method after 2006. It implied that the policy only 
raises the lowest threshold for transferred land prices. 
Combined with the result that the land supply only slightly 
decreased the transfer price of listed land after 2006, this 
shows that the industrial land market has not developed a 
mature market-oriented mechanism. The research reveals 
that industrial land quotas may be overly high. Among 
zoning variables, the GREEN indicator was the impact 
factor with the greatest value for industrial land, followed 
by FAR and DENSITY. Moreover, the results imply that 
the effect of land use regulations varies among land trans-
fer types, firm ownership types and development zones. 
Land use regulation instruments had a significant impact 
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on private and foreign companies. In contrast, impacts 
on state-owned enterprises were not obvious for most of 
the land regulation characteristics. The impact of land use 
regulation instruments was considerably higher for land 
plots outside national and provincial development zones.
The particular findings in this paper are significant 
in both theoretical and empirical terms and can be at-
tributed to the modification of land use regulatory tools 
and promote the efficient use of industrial land (Li et al., 
2019a). Although industrial land differs from residential 
land and commercial land, reducing direct governmental 
intervention and promoting transparent, competitive pro-
cedures will still benefit efficient land management (Ka-
ganova et al., 2008). It is necessary not only to change the 
method of industrial land transfer from negotiation to the 
more open and transparent methods of listing and auction 
type but also to reduce the “hidden” tendency threshold 
on the listing conditions, which holds the key for mature 
market mechanisms. It is well known that the land supply 
quota plays an important role in meeting the demands of 
industrial firms and should be carefully designed. A fore-
casting model is recommended to help estimate the effect 
of planning policy (Hui & Ho, 2003). An experiment in-
volving the RBF neural network model has been designed 
to predict reasonable industrial demand and link it to rea-
sonable supply (Li et al., 2019b). In the meantime, FAR, 
DENSITY and GREEN indicators should be modified 
more scientifically and in line with industrial categories.
This study discussed the impact of land use regulations 
on industrial land prices. This provides a new perspec-
tive for understanding the system of land use regulation 
in developing countries, which is different from those in 
developed countries. However, this study has some short-
comings. This study analyzed this relationship only based 
on the OLS model, and a spatial econometric model may 
be another choice for future researchers to control for the 
spatial autocorrelation of land prices. Moreover, in this 
study, the data on tender- and auction-transferred land 
plots are limited, and further studies should attempt to 
include more samples to deepen our understanding.
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